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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This appeal involves a personal Injury action filed by Gregory and Caralee Beers, 
individually and on behalf of Heidi Beers ("Heidi"), their 13 year old daughter, who was injured 
jumping into a river from the Smiths Ferry Bridge in Smiths Ferry, Idaho. The District Court 
granted summary judgment to 12 individually named defendants on the negligence cause of 
action brought by the Beerses, holding that none of them owed any legally recognized duty to 
Heidi when she jumped from the Smiths Ferry Bridge. The Beerses have appealed this decision 
as to 9 of these individual defendants: Warren Ririe, Sharolyn Ririe, Phil Haueter, Brent 
Rasmussen, Beth Rasmussen, Mark Kropf, Brenda Kropf, Bradley Day and Garrett Haueter (the 
"Individual Respondents"). The Court also granted summary judgment on the Beers' statutory 
claims for injury to a child as to eight of the individual defendants, but denied summary 
judgment as to the remaining four. 1 
2. Statement of Facts 
a. Background 
The Individual Respondents in this case are all members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints ("LDS Church" or "Church"). All individual Respondents, except Garrett 
Haueter, were members of the Autumn Faire Ward (the "Ward"), a congregation of the LDS 
Church located in Meridian, Idaho. Garrett Haueter was a member of another Ward of the LDS 
Church. (R., pp. 000790-000791, Garrett Haueter Depo., pp. 9-10.) At the time of the incident 
1 The Beerses are not appealing this aspect of the District Court's decision. (R., 002011-002017 .) 
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in question, Heidi participated in the Ward, though her parents, Greg and Caralee Beers, were 
not generally active in the ward. (R., pp. 000813-000814, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 41-42; R., 
000849 and 000851, Caralee Beers Depo., pp. 176, 183-84.) 
The Autumn Faire Ward (the "Ward"), like most LDS wards, plans and carries out 
various social activities for its members. In 2007, those general ward social activities were 
planned and organized by an "Activities Committee," which acted under the general direction of 
the bishop of the Ward. (R., 000747, Mark Kropf Depo., pp. 16-17; R., 000856, Lisa Panek 
Depo., p. 12.) The chairperson (and sole member) of the Activities Committee was Lisa Panek. 
(R. 000747, Mark KropfDepo., pp. 16-17; R., 000855-000856, Lisa Panek Depo., pp. 9-10.) In 
August 2007, the bishop of the Ward was Karl Christensen. (R., 000747, Mark KropfDepo., p. 
14.) 
b. Greg and Caralee Beers Acted at All Times as Heidi's Parents 
Gregory and Caralee Beers provided all necessary financial support for Heidi, as Heidi's 
parents. (R., 000868.) They have also provided all necessary education, instruction, and care 
for Heidi's general welfare. (R., 000869.) Heidi Beers has always resided in the home 
maintained by her parents, Gregory and Caralee Beers. (R., 000869.) Gregory and Caralee 
Beers have always given Heidi the affection commensurate with the parent-child relationship. 
(R., 000870.) 
The Individual Respondents did not act in a parental role as to Heidi. For example, 
Warren and Sharolyn Ririe, Phil and Merlinda Haueter, Brent and Beth Rasmussen, Mark and 
Brenda Kropf, Kirt and Katie Nielsen, Brad Day or Garrett Haueter have not provided financial 
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supp01i of a parent to Heidi or provided necessary education, instruction and care for Heidi's 
general welfare. (R., 000868-000869.) Furthermore, Heidi has never resided with these 
Respondents. (R., 000869-000870.) Additionally, these Respondents have never given Heidi 
the affection commensurate with the parent-child relationship. (R., 000870-000871.) Also, 
neither Gregory nor Caralee Beers contacted any of the Respondents prior to the subject Ward 
activity (i.e., camp-out) to arrange for any of these Respondents to watch or supervise Heidi at 
the camp-out. (R., 000871-000872.) 
c. The Campout 
In the Summer of 2007, the Ward Activities Committee planned a Ward campout to be 
held August 17-18, 2007, at a cabin near Smiths Ferry, Idaho. (R., 000857, Lisa Panek Depo., 
pp. 16-17.) The cabin was owned by two members of the Ward, Frank and Gloria Skinner 
(referred to hereafter as the "Skinners' cabin" or the "Skinners' property"). (R., 000819, Heidi 
Beers Depo., p. 75.) During the planning of the activity, there was never any discussion of 
swimming in the river or jumping from the bridge as part of the activity. (R., 000864, Karl 
Christensen Depo., pp. 62-63.) 
There was no formal signup, payment or RSVP process for the families who desired to 
attend the Ward camp-out. (R., 000756, Brenda Kropf Depo., p. 14; R., 000706, Sharolyn Ririe 
Depo., p. 17; R., 000730, Brent Rasmussen Depo., p. 23; R., 000859, Lisa Panek Depo., p. 22.) 
The event was announced at Church meetings and those who wished to go were welcome to do 
so. 
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As admitted by Heidi Beers herself, the "agenda" of organized events for the camp-out 
were as follows: 
August 17 (Friday): Dutch oven, potluck dinner 
Evening campfire devotional and sing-along 
August 18 (Saturday): Breakfast cooked by Ward members 
(R., 000818, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 70-73; R., 000707, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 18-19; R., 
000699, Warren Ririe Depo., pp. 22-23; R., 000729, Brent Rasmussen Depo., p. 17; R., 000858, 
Lisa Panek Depo., p. 19; R., 000864, Karl Christensen Depo., p. 63.) She also admits that 
following the Saturday morning breakfast, the Church sponsored and organized events of the 
campout were concluded. (R., 000818, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 70-73; see also R., 000858, Lisa 
Panek Depo., p. 19; R., 000800, Richard Kartchner Depo, p. 31; R., 000864, Karl Christensen 
Depo., p. 63; R., 000775- 000776, Katie Nielsen Depo., pp. 20, 27-28; R., 000749, Mark Kropf 
Depo., pp. 31-32; R., 000707, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 18-19; R., R., 000729, Brent Rasmussen 
Depo., p. 17.) Thereafter, families and individuals were free to go home or engage in whatever 
activities they chose. (R. 000818, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 70-73; R., 000775, Katie Nielsen 
Depo., p. 20.) Some people left directly after breakfast (R., 000786, Brad Day Depo., pp. 39-40; 
R., 000776, Katie Nielsen Depo., pp. 27-28), some went fishing (R., 000741, Beth Rasmussen 
Depo., pp. 22-23), some shot off pop bottle rockets (R., 000770, Kirt Nielsen Depo., pp. 30-31), 
some went for ahike (R., 000719, Phil Haueter Depo., pp. 22-24), some went to play by or swim 
in the river (R., 000740, Beth Rasmussen Depo, p. 20; R., 000709, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., p. 32), 
and some decided play in or around the river. Any and all of these activities were at the choice 
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and discretion of the individual \Yard members; there was no Ward involvement, direction or 
supervision for such. (R., 000775, Katie Nielsen Depo. p. 20.) Ward members were simply free 
to go and do as they chose following the breakfast. (R., 000818, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 70-73; 
R., 000775, Katie Nielsen Depo., p. 20; R., 000770, Kirt Nielsen Depo., pp. 31-32; R., 000864, 
Karl Christensen Depo., p. 63.) 
None of the Individual Respondents were on the Activities Committee that planned the 
campout. (R., 000698, Warren Ririe Depo., p. 11; R., 000705, 000707, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 
11, 20; R., R., 000723, Merlinda Haueter Depo., p. 9; R., 000717, Phil Haueter Depo., p. 14; R., 
000728, Brent Rasmussen Depo., pp. 10-11; R., 000774, Katie Nielsen Depo., pp. 8-9; R., 
000766, Kirt Nielsen Depo., pp. 12-13; R., 000739, Beth Rasmussen Depo., p. 12; R., 000746, 
Mark Kropf Depo., p. 12; R., 000755, Brenda Kropf Depo., p. 11; R., 000780, Brad Day Depo., 
p. 14.) None were involved in any way in planning, organizing or leading the Ward campout in 
question. (Id.) They simply attended as Ward members who wished to go. 
Heidi was 13 years old in August 2007. She heard the Ward campout being announced at 
Church and wished to attend. (R., 000815, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 61.) She talked to her parents 
and was planning to go to the campout with her Mother and younger sister. (R., 000816, Id. at 
pp. 63-64.) Later, however, Heidi's parents decided they would not or could not go. (Id.) 
Accordingly, Heidi asked a friend in the Ward, Shelby Wolfe, if she could get a ride to the 
campout with the Wolfe family. (R., 000815, Id. at pp. 61-62.) This was initially agreed to, but 
just before the campout, Heidi learned that the Wolfes would not be able to attend the campout. 
(R., 000816, Id. at pp. 65.) Accordingly, Heidi asked another friend, Claire Kartchner, if she 
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could ride up to Smiths Ferry with her family. (R., 000816-000817, Id. at pp. 65-66.) Claire 
said this would be all right, after checking with her parents. (R., 000817, Id. at pp. 66-67.) This 
request was made the morning of the day the camp-out was to begin. (R., 000817, Id. at p. 67.) 
Greg and Caralee Beers had no discussions with the Kartchners about their daughter 
Heidi riding to the Smiths Ferry with them. (R., 000846-000848, Caralee Beers Depo., pp. 32-
35, 41; R., 000806, Kathy Kartchner Depo., pp. 21-23.) Indeed, they did not ask any adult to 
keep an eye on Heidi. (R., 000848, Caralee Beers Depo., p. 41.) Specifically, Heidi's parents 
did not speak to any of the Individual Respondents to make arrangements. (R., 000849, 000850, 
Caralee Beers Depo., p. 174, 179.) The Kartchners understood that they were merely giving 
Heidi a ride to the camp-out and had no further role. (R., 000805-000807, Kathy Kartchner 
Depo., pp. 20-21, 24-25.) Heidi simply told her parents that she was going to ride with the 
Kartchners and Caralee Beers assented. (R., 000847, Caralee Beers Depo., p. 35.) Heidi's 
grandfather, Ray Beers (who was also a member of the Ward), had offered to take Heidi with 
him to the campout, but Heidi preferred to go with her friend, Claire. (R., 000816, Heidi Beers 
Depo., pp. 64-65.) Ray Beers ultimately drove to the campout by himself. (R., 000846, Caralee 
Beers Depo., p. 30.) Heidi's mother did not even ask Ray Beers to supervise Heidi. (R., 000848, 
Caralee Beers Depo., p. 41.) 
The Kartchners and Heidi arrived at the campout on Friday evening, August 17, 2007, in 
the early evening. (R., 000820, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 79.) Heidi had dinner with her friends. 
(Id.) 
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d. The Events on Friday, August 17, 2007 
In the evening of Friday, August 17, 2007, a small group of youths approached Brad Day, 
an adult in the Ward who was at the campout with his own family, and asked if he would drive 
them to the Smiths Ferry Bridge in his pickup. (R., 000821, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 82-84; R., 
R., 000782-000783, Brad Day Depo., pp. 25-26.) He told them he would be agreeable if they got 
permission from their parents. (R., 000782-000783, Brad Day Depo., pp. 25-26.) The youths 
returned a short while later and said they had permission. (Id) Heidi did not ask the Kartchners 
or anyone for permission to go to the bridge. (R., 000822, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 86-87.) Brad 
Day then took the group, which included Heidi, to the bridge, which was approximately one mile 
away. Some of the kids wanted to jump into the river from the bridge, so Mr. Day had some of 
them check for rocks or other obstructions in the water. (R., 000823, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 90-
91, 216-17; R., 000738, Brad Day Depo., pp. 26-28.) After finding none and determining that it 
was safe, 10-11 kids jumped into the \Yater without injury. (R., 000824, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 
94.) Mr. Day told the youths to jump between the pilings where they had checked the water for 
obstructions. (R., 000784-000785, Brad Day Depo., pp. 33-34.) Heidi chose not to jump on 
Friday evening, though she urged other kids to do so. (R., 000824, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 96.) 
Heidi did not believe it was dangerous or that they would get hurt by jumping. (Id.) The group 
then returned to the Skinners' cabin without incident. 
It was not generally known on Friday evening that the small group of kids had gone to 
the bridge and jumped. (R., 000825, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 106-07; R., 000860, Lisa Panek 
Depo., pp. 26-27; R., 000785, Brad Day Depo., pp. 35-36; R., 000718, Phil Haueter Depo., p. 21; 
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R., 000769, Kirt Nielsen Depo., p. 27; R., 000776, Katie Nielsen Depo., p. 28; R., 000792-
000793, Garrett Haueter Depo., pp. 17-18; R., 000748, Mark Kropf Depo., pp. 26-28; R., 
000700, Warren Ririe Depo., p. 27; R., 000708, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., p. 26; R., 000731, Brent 
Rasmussen Depo., p 29; R., 000742, Beth Rasmussen Depo., p. 26; R., 000808, Kathy Kartchner 
Depo., p. 29.) Heidi Beers, and virtually all the other persons deposed in the case, testified that 
there was no general discussion back at the camp Friday evening about the jumping, and none of 
the individual Ward members knew of the jumping except Brenda Kropf. (Id.; see also R., 
000757, Brenda Kropf Depo., p. 25.) 
e. The Events on Saturday, August 18, 2007 
On the morning of Saturday, August 18, 2007, the Ward members arose and ate the 
scheduled breakfast. (R., 000826, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 110; R., 000698, 000701, Warren Ririe 
Depo., pp. 11, 30.) After breakfast, the Church activity ended and people were free to do as they 
chose. (R. 000818, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 70-73; R., 000775, Katie Nielsen Depo., p. 20.) 
Several families, including adults and children, decided to go down to the river, some to play in 
the water and others to jump from the bridge. (R., 000709, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., p. 32.) Heidi 
went to the bridge with some friends. (R., 000826, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 111.) Again, she did 
not seek permission to do so from any of the Individual Respondents. (R., 000826, Heidi Beers 
Depo., p. 113.) The record is unclear as to whether Heidi walked to the bridge or was given a 
ride by Sharolyn Ririe. (R., 000827, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 114; R., 000709, Sharolyn Ririe 
Depo., p. 32.) It is undisputed, however, that on Saturday morning Heidi did not tell any of the 
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Viard members that she planned to go down to the Smiths Ferry Bridge. (R., 000826-000827, 
Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 112-15.) 
The Smiths Ferry Bridge spans the Payette River. Some have compared its height to the 
height of a high dive at a public swimming pool. (R., 000738, Brent Rasmussen Depo., p. 35.) 
It was only about six to eight feet above the water. (R., 000809, Kathy Kartchner Depo, p. 34; 
R., 000801, Richard Kartchner Depo., p. 42.) Before anyone jumped that Saturday morning, 
certain areas of the water were checked for obstructions and none were found. (R., 000795-
000796, Garrett Haueter Depo., pp. 29-30; R., 000740, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., p. 35.) No hazards 
were observed at the bridge. (R., 000795-000796, Garrett Haueter Depo., pp. 29-30.) Garrett 
Haueter told everyone at the bridge to jump at the location that had been checked. (R., 000795-
000796, Id. at pp. 28-30.) The water was sufficiently deep at the location of the jumping. (R., 
000795-000796, Id.; R., 000708, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 28-29; R., 000783, Brad Day Depo., 
pp. 26-27.) The adults present at the bridge did not see any unusual danger or risk in jumping 
from the bridge into the water, and many allowed their own children to do so. (R., 000795, 
Garrett Haueter Depo., p. 29; R., 000785, Brad Day Depo., p. 34; R., 000752, Mark Kropf 
Depo., p. 62; R., 000759-000760, Brenda Kropf, pp. 37-39, 66-67; R., 000808-000809, Kathy 
Kartchner Depo., pp. 32-34; R., 000712, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 43-44; R., 000738-000739, 
Brent Rasmussen Depo., pp. 35, 37-38.) Indeed, one family allowed their seven-year-old son, 
who was a capable swimmer, to jump into the water. (R., 000711, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., p. 41; 
R., 000738, Brent Rasmussen Depo., pp. 34-35.) Ironically, Heidi's mother told one of the 
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Respondents that she would have allowed Heidi to jump if she had been at the campout. (R., 
000735, Brent Rasmussen Depo., p. 61.) 
Several youths jumped from the bridge Saturday morning, many jumping multiple times 
and all without incident. (R., 000828, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 122.) Heidi stood on the bridge 
during this time, urging others to jump but initially stating that she was afraid to do so. (R., 
000831, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 140; R., 000712-000713, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 42-43, 53.) A 
while later, she suddenly changed her mind, said, "Wish me luck," and jumped. (R., 000831, 
Heidi Beers Depo., p. 140; R., 000712-000713, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 42-43, 53.) 
There is a conflict in the testimony as to where Heidi jumped, with some saying she 
jumped between the pillars of the bridge, and others, including Heidi herself, saying that she 
jumped over a pillar. (R., 000829-000830, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 132-34; R., 000761, Brenda 
Knopf Depo., pp. 48-49.) It is undisputed, though, that Heidi chose the location from which she 
jumped and did not consult with anyone or ask anyone's permission about her choice before 
suddenly jumping. (R., 000830, 000838, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 134-35, 216-17.) Further, to 
the extent that she jumped over the pillar, this was a different location from that checked for 
hazards where the others jumped. 
It is unclear at this point how Heidi was injured. No one saw her hit anything. She 
adamantly denies hitting the bottom of the river, and cannot say that she hit the bridge's support 
pillar either. (R., 000832-000833, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 143-44, 146.) Her testimony is merely 
that she felt pain as she "hit the water." (Id.) It is undisputed that Heidi injured her right 
ankle/leg as a result of jumping from the Smiths Ferry Bridge. 
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Because of the number of Respondents involved in this case, it is helpful to precisely 
state the location of each at the time of the incident and their involvement, or lack thereof, in the 
events of Saturday, August 18, 2007. The following matrix, based entirely on the undisputed 
deposition testimony in the case, is an effort to assist the Court in understanding the role, if any, 
of the various individuals at issue: 
Aware people On the bridge Aware 
planned to Saturday Heidi Beers Saw Heidi 
Attended jump Saturday morning when intended to Beers 
Name Cam pout a.m. Heidi .iumped .iump jump 
Warren Ririe1 Yes No No No No 
Sharolyn Ririe3 Yes No Yes No Yes 
Phil Haueter4 Yes No No No No 
Merlinda No No No No No 
Haueter5 
Brent Rasmussenb Yes Yes No No No 
Beth Rasmussen1 Yes Yes No No No 
Mark Kropf Yes His daughter No No No 
only 
Brenda Kropf Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Kirt Nielsen 10 Yes No No No No 
Katie Nielsen 11 Yes No No No No 
2 R., 000700-000701, Warren Ririe Depo., pp. 27, 31-32 (was not aware of people jumping off the bridge; did not go 
to the bridge). 
3 R., 000708, 000712, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 26, 42-45 (Heidi originally said she was not going to jump; later 
saw Heidi Beers jump). 
4 R., 000717, 000719, Phil Haueter Depo., pp. 14, 24 (never went to the bridge Saturday morning). 
5 R., 000724, Merlinda Haueter Depo., pp. 11-12 (did not attend the camp-out). 
6 R., 000732-000733, Brent Rasmussen Depo., pp. 30-31, 34 (was not on the bridge when Heidi Beers jumped). 
7 R., 000742, Beth Rasmussen Depo., pp. 27-28 (did not go to the bridge prior to the accident). 
8 R., 000749-000751, Mark KropfDepo., pp. 33, 37-40 (was not present at the bridge when the accident happened). 
9 R., 000757-000758, Brenda KropfDepo., pp. 25, 30-32 (saw Heidi Beers jump). 
10 R., 000767-000768, 000770, Kirt Nielsen Depo., pp. 21-22, 33 (did not go to the bridge prior to the accident). 
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I Brad Day 1L Yes I No No No I No I 
I Garrett Haueteru Yes I Yes Yes No No I 
*(The individuals in bold are dismissed from the case and are not Respondents.) 
There is no evidence that any of the individual ward members at issue agreed to 
supervise, chaperone or take care of Heidi at the Ward cam pout. (See record, generally.) Indeed, 
they were all engaged in taking care of their own families. (See record, generally.) There is no 
evidence that any of the individual Ward members encouraged Heidi to jump from the bridge. 
(See record, generally.) Most of them were not even present when she jumped from the bridge. 
(See chart above.) One Respondent named by the Beerses, Merlinda Haueter, did not even 
attend the campout and was not in Smiths Ferry, Idaho at the time of Heidi's jump and injury. 
(R., 000724, Merlinda Haueter Depo., pp. 11-12.) The two or three who were at the bridge did 
not know Heidi planned to jump until the last second, when she announced that she had changed 
her mind and quickly jumped. (R., 000708, 000712, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 26, 42-45.) It 
was Heidi's choice, and hers alone to jump, and she chose where to jump. (R., 000830, 000836, 
Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 134-35, 200.) 
f. Church Callings of the Individual Respondents 
Sharolyn Ririe's calling in the Ward in August 2007 was as "Instructor for Achievement 
Day Girls or Activity Day, Girls Ages 8-10." (Appellants' Brief, p. 39.) In her deposition, Ms. 
Ririe explained that in this calling, she was merely a daytime teacher for girls 8 to 10, and 
11 R., 000776, Katie Nielsen Depo., pp. 26-28 (did not go to the bridge prior to the accident). 
12 R., 000781, 000785-000786, Brad Day Depo., pp. 19, 35-40 (left after breakfast, before accident). 
13 R., 000793-000794, Garrett Haueter Depo., pp. 21-22 (was at the bridge; did not see Heidi Beers jump). 
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sometimes 11, years old. (R., 000705, Sharolyn Ririe Depo., p. 11, 11. 17-24.) As a 13 year old, 
Heidi was not in her class. Regardless, there is no evidence that Ms. Ririe, because of her 
voluntary, unpaid religious calling with the Church, had any leadership responsibilities in the 
Ward or at the campout, or that she had any responsibility for Heidi. 
Regarding Phil Haueter, he testified his calling with the church in August 2007 was as 
"Teacher's Quorum Advisor." (R., 1202, Philip Haueter Depo., p. 9, 11. 17-20.) This calling did 
not involve Heidi Beers in anyway. There is no evidence that Mr. Haueter, because of his 
religious calling with the Church, had any responsibilities at the campout or that he had any 
responsibility for Heidi. 
With respect to Warren Ririe, his calling in the Church in August 2007 was as "high 
priest group leader." (R., 000698, Warren Ririe Depo, p. 11, 11. 11-15.) His duties were 
"Primarily to be responsible for the high priest priesthood quorum and home teaching of families 
that were assigned to that group." (Id., p. 11, 11. 16-20.) This calling did not involve Heidi 
Beers. The Beerses claim that Mr. Ririe was the leader at the Ward Campout in the absence of 
Noal Fisher and Karl Christensen. (Appellants' Brief, p. 39.) The citations by the Beerses, 
however, only evidence that Mr. Ririe was the high priest group leader and that Noal Fisher 
testified that when he left the campout, "the responsibility of the ward would have been left to 
the high priest group leader or the elders quorum presidency and also to the individual parents 
and families." (R., 001126, Noal Fisher Depo., 32:12-33:6.) At most, Mr. Ririe was tasked with 
cooking breakfast at the campout. (R., 00698, Warren Ririe Depo., p. 13. 11. 1-9.) There is no 
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evidence that Mr. Ririe's religious calling required him to be responsible for the campout or that 
he had any responsibility for Heidi Beers because of this calling. 
Brent Rasmussen's calling in August 2007 was as a "Ward Clerk." (R. 1141, 11:25 -
12:4; 12:12-21.) This clerical calling entailed taking minutes on meetings and recording 
attendance at meetings, such as ward council meetings and regular Sunday meetings at the 
Church. (R. 001141, p. 12, 11. 5-11.) Again, there is no evidence that Mr. Rasmussen's religious 
calling made him responsible for the campout or that he had any control or responsibility over 
Heidi Beers in light of this calling. 
Beth Rasmussen's calling with the Church in August 2007 was "Teacher and Activity 
Day Leader, Girls Ages 11-12." (R., 001150, p. 12, 11. 3 - 9.) Her calling involved teaching 11-
12 year old girls on Sunday and once a week every other week. (R., 001150, p. 12, 11. 10-15.) 
This calling did not involve Heidi Beers. There is no evidence that Ms. Rasmussen's religious 
calling required her to be responsible for the campout attended by the Ward members or that she 
had any responsibility for Heidi Beers due to this calling. 
In August 2007, Mark Kropfs calling with the Church was as "Counselor for Stake 
Young Men's Presidency."14 (R., 001087, p. 12, 11. 18-25.) This calling did not involve Heidi 
Beers. There is no evidence that Mr. Kropf s religious calling required him to be responsible for 
the campout attended by the Ward members or that he had any responsibility of Heidi Beers due 
to this calling. 
14 A "Stake" is a division of ecclesiastical territory in the LDS Church, consisting of a number of Wards. 
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Brenda Kropf could not remember her calling with the Church in August 2007, but 
thought it may have been as "Primary Instructor." (R., 001129, p. 11, 11. 4 - 11.) This calling 
did not involve Heidi Beers. As with the other individuals singled out by the Beerses, there is no 
evidence that Ms. Kropfs religious calling required her to be responsible for the campout 
attended by the Ward members or that she had any responsibility of Heidi Beers due to this 
calling. 
With respect to Bradley Day, his Church calling in August 2007 was as Sunday School 
Teacher for Boys and Girls who were 13, turning 14 years of age. (R., 001183, p. 14, 11. 10-21.) 
His calling entailed teaching classes from a Sunday school manual. (R., 001183, p. 15, 11. 17-
21.) While Heidi Beers may have attended his classes on Sundays, there is no evidence that Mr. 
Day's religious calling required him to be responsible for the campout attended by the Ward 
members or that he had any responsibility of Heidi Beers due to this calling. 
3. Statement of District Court Proceedings 
On August 11, 2009, the Beers es filed their Complaint in this action. (R., 000014-
000027.) Answers were filed by all defendants, including the 9 individual defendants/ 
respondents at issue in this appeal. (R., 000091-000098; R. 000116-000128; 000392-000404.) 
On July 20, 2010, the Beerses filed a Motion to Amend Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial seeking leave to amend their Complaint to name additional defendants and to add a cause 
of action for child abuse under the "Tort Actions in Child Abuse Cases Act," I.C. § 6-1701 et 
seq. (R., 000300-000302.) Respondents filed objections to the Beers' Motion to Amend. (R., 
000355-000362 and 000416-000426.) On September 8, 2010, the Court granted the Beers' 
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Motion to Amend their Complaint. (R., 000434-000436.) On September 15, 2010, the Beerses 
filed their Amended Complaint asserting (1) negligence and, (2) a violation of the child abuse 
statutes against a total of 14 individual defendants and the Church. (R., 000461-000479.) All 
Defendants subsequently filed Answers and Jury Demands to the Amended Complaint, including 
the 9 defendants/respondents at issue in the appeal. (R., 000501-000518; R., 000619-000636.) 
In March 2011, 12 of the individual defendants, excluding Richard and Kathy Kartchner, 
filed Motions for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of all of the Beers' claims in the 
action against them. (R. at 000688-000901.) In its May 10, 2011 Order, the District Court 
granted all 12 individual defendant's summary judgment on the negligence causes of action. (R., 
001545-001559.) The Court also granted summary judgment to 8 of the 12 individual 
defendants on the child abuse tort cause of action. (R., 001560-1561.) On that claim, the Court 
denied summary judgment as to 4 individual defendants - Sharolyn Ririe, Garrett Haueter, Mark 
Kropf and Brent Rasmussen (R., 001559-1561.) 
On or about August 26, 2011, the Beerses filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of 
the District Court's May 10, 2011 Order, which granted the 12 individual defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on the negligence cause of action. (R. at 001878-001880.) The Beers' Rule 
54(b) Certification motion went to hearing on September 2, 2011 before the District Court. (See 
September 2, 2011 transcript.) Following the hearing the District Court certified its Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b). (R. at 002009.) Although the District Court signed this Rule 54(b) 
Certification, the District Court did not enter a written order regarding its decision on the Rule 
54(b) Certification issue. (See Record, generally.) During the September 2, 2011 hearing on the 
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ce1iification issue, however, the District Court indicated it was granting the Rule 54(b) 
certification and vacating the trial. (September 2, 2011 Transcript (T.) at pp. 180-187.) 
On October 26, 2011, the Beerses filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court 
appealing the District Court's dismissal of their negligence claims as to 9 of the 12 individual 
defendants. 15 (R. at 002011-002017.) On November 15, 2011, Sharolyn Ririe, Brent 
Rasmussen, Brenda Kropf and Gan-ett Hauter filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal in the matter before 
the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the District Court's denial of their summary judgment 
motion on the child abuse tort action claims against them by the Beerses. (R. at 002030-
002036.) 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A Cross-Appeal has been filed by Sharolyn Ririe, Brent Rasmussen, Brenda Kropf and 
Garrett Haueter in this action involving the issue of whether the District Court erred in its May 
10, 2011 Order, in part, in its determination of the scope of the law and duties required under 
Idaho's Tort Actions in Child Abuse Cases, I.C. § 6-1701, et seq. (R., 002030-002036.) 
In the alternative to their Cross-Appeal, Sharolyn Ririe, Brent Rasmussen, Brenda Kropf 
and Gan-ett Haueter respectfully ask the Supreme Court to consider the issues and the arguments 
in the Cross-Appeal as "Additional Issues on Appeal" pursuant to I.AR. 35(b)(4). As such, all 
substance and arguments in their cross-appeal are incorporated herein. It is insufficient to simply 
address the Beers' arguments on the issue of negligence. Clearly, there is a significant 
15 As noted later in this brief, the Beerses admitted in their Memorandum in Opposition to the individual 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memorandum in Opposition") that they had no factual or legal basis 
for any claims against Merlinda Haueter, Kirt Nielsen and Katie Nielsen, who they had named as Defendants. (R., 
001241, footnote I.) Hence, the Beerses have not appealed the summary judgment order against these defendants. 
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inconsistency in that the District Court found that none of the Individual Respondents were liable 
under any theory of negligence, but nevertheless held that some of them could be guilty of "child 
abuse" under I.C. § 6-1701 et seq. simply because they were in the general vicinity when Heidi 
jumped from the bridge and hurt herself. Further error is found in the District Court's ruling that 
the injury to child statute creates an "affirmative duty to act." (R., 001559.) These issues should 
be addressed in the cross-appeal, but can also be addressed under I.A.R. 35(b)(4). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment may be entered when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also 
Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 375, 3 P.3d 51, 53 (2000). The moving party has the burden of 
showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 
890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007). In opposing the motion, however, '"a mere scintilla of 
evidence or slight doubt as to facts' is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of 
summary judgment." See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 
996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000). The nonmoving party "must respond to the summary judgment 
motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. When reviewing a 
district court's order for summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court exercises the same 
standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Castorena v. General Elec., 
149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010)(internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review over all questions of law. Id. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Beers' Negligence Claims Have No Basis in Law or Fact. 
1. The Beers' Negligence Claims Have No Basis in Fact. 
The most remarkable thing about the Beers' claims against the Individual Respondents is 
their utter randomness. Here, plaintiffs sued ordinary Ward members who had no leadership or 
supervisory role whatsoever as to the campout. 
Even more bizarre and random is the fact that the Beerses did not include most or all of 
the adults actually present at the bridge at the time of Heidi Beers' accident, although those 
adults would not have been liable either. Instead, they sued 12 individuals, 9 of whom were not 
even on the bridge when Heidi jumped. One of the individuals was never even in Smiths Ferry 
for the campout! Others had already left the campout after the planned activity, to go home prior 
to the incident. Thus, whom the Beerses chose to sue is so random and illogical that their claims 
simply make no sense from a factual standpoint. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the ill-conceived nature of this case is the huge shifts in 
theories and concessions made throughout the course of the case in the District Court. For 
example, the Beers' sole negligence theory in the First Amended Complaint was Count One, 
denominated "Negligence - In Loco Parentis." (R. 000470-000473.) (Counts Two and Three 
are derivative, merely seeking damages for economic loss to Heidi Beers' parents.) At summary 
judgment, however (as well as in this appeal), the Beerses completely abandoned the in loco 
parentis theory, making no arguments in support. (R. 001239-001261.) 
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Further, the Beerses conceded at summary judgment that they had no factual or legal 
basis for claims against three of the individual defendants, Merlinda Haueter, Kirt Nielsen and 
Katie Nielsen. (R. OOI242-00I252.) Moreover, the Beerses conceded the lack of any negligence 
claims against three other individual defendants, Warren Ririe, Beth Rasmussen, and Phil 
Haueter. (Id.) 
Finally, in their Motion to Reconsider, the Beerses only asked the District Court to 
specifically reconsider its ruling as to the conduct of 2 individuals - Brent Rasmussen and 
Garrett Haueter. (R., OOI685-00I688.) 
The randomness and shotgun nature of the Beers' claims, as well as their ever-shifting 
theories, is indicative of the factual insufficiencies, as shown herein. Little wonder then that the 
District Court found no factual basis for their negligence claims. 
B. The Beers' Negligence Claims Have No Basis in Law. 
1. There is No Basis for a General Duty of Care. 
To sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must show: (1) a duty, recognized 
by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; 
(3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and ( 4) actual 
loss or damage. See West v. Sanke, I32 Idaho 133, I42, 968 P.2d 228, 237 (1998) citing Brooks 
v. Logan, I27 Idaho 484, 489, 903 P.2d 73, 78 (1995); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. 
Idaho First Nat'! Bank, NA., 119 Idaho I7I, I75-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (199I); Alegria v. 
Payonk, IOI Idaho 6I7, 6I9, 6I9 P.2d I35, I37 (1980). No liability for negligence arises unless 
the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. See Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, 97 Idaho 32, 539 
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P.2d 584 (1975). The question of whether a duty exists generally is a question of law. Freeman 
v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 808 P.2d 1300 (1991). Also, as discussed later in this brief, there is "no 
affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another absent unusual circumstances, which justify 
imposing such an affirmative responsibility." Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 
388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). 
The Beerses cite Doe v. Garcia for the rule that "one owes the duty to every person in our 
society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it 
could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such 
injury." 131 Idaho 578, 581, 961P.2d1181, 1184(1998), quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 
617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980)(emphasis added). Notably, however, Doe v. Garcia was 
later abrogated by the Idaho Supreme Court, which held that the Garcia case "extend[ed] the 
duty of an employer too far for consequences outside employment over which the employer has 
no realistic control." Hunter v. State of Idaho, 138 Idaho 44, 50, 57 P.3d 755, 761 (2002). Also, 
the Alegria case, relied on in Garcia, "involved a suit against bartenders who served an 
obviously intoxicated minor liquor. The minor then killed a woman in an automobile accident. 
The theory of the [Alegria] case was that the bartenders had acted affirmatively; they served the 
minor before he got in his automobile." Hunter, 138 Idaho at 50 (emphasis added). In other 
words, the duty of ordinary care applies when a person is affirmatively doing something to 
someone else. 
The case at bar, however, does not involve allegations by the Beerses that any of the 
Individual Respondents acted affirmatively to injure Heidi. Rather, the crux of the Beers' 
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contention is that the Individual Respondents failed to act by "not personally inspect[ing] the 
safety of the Bridge and the River or provid[ing] any meaningful caution about the potential 
danger readily apparent." (See Appellants' Brief, p. 32.) Since the Beerses do not claim that any 
of the Respondents affirmatively injured Heidi or otherwise committed any affirmative acts 
toward Heidi, the general duty of ordinary care is inapplicable to these Respondents. The Beers' 
general negligence claims against the Respondents were properly dismissed by the District Court 
because the Beerses failed to establish, as a matter of law, that any of the Respondents owed a 
duty to Heidi Beers. 
2. The Circumstances of this Case Do Not Justify the Creation of a New Duty. 
Having failed to show that any Individual Respondent owed a duty to Heidi Beers, the 
Beerses argue that this case presents a situation where the Court should "balance" factors to 
determine whether a new duty arises in this particular situation. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
previously identified several factors for the Court to consider in determining whether a duty 
arises in a particular situation: 
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care 
with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved. 
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995)(quoted cases omitted). However, 
this "balancing of the harms" is only done in rare circumstances where there is a question as to 
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whether a duty recognized by law needs to be expanded. Id. at 148. The Beerses have 
identified no authority that supports the need for "balancing of the harms" in this case. 
In Rife, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that it previously had "recognized a common 
law duty to protect against the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to a student while in [a 
School] District's custody", but determined that it needed to balance the harms to decide whether 
it would extend the duty of a school district once the student is no longer in a relationship of 
control or supervision by the District. Id. 
By asking this Court to consider Rife 's "balancing of the harms" factors, the Beerses 
admit that there currently is no legally recognized duty owed by any of the 9 individual 
Respondents to Heidi because they are asking this Court to expand or create a new duty of care 
in a situation where it has never before been recognized. Additionally, as further discussed 
below, there is no special relationship (as there was in Rife), which requires consideration of 
expanding or adding a new duty of care. 
Nonetheless, even if the "balancing of the harms" factors are considered, the facts of the 
case do not support expanding a duty to any of the Individual Respondents who either were not 
present at the bridge during the jumping, or were innocent bystanders with no connection or 
special relationship to Heidi. 
The Beerses spend a lot of effort arguing that a duty should attach because Heidi's injury 
was reasonably foreseeable. The Beerses suggest that Respondents knew that the bridge jumping 
was dangerous prior to Heidi's jump from the bridge. This is simply false. There is absolutely 
no evidence that any of the Respondents had any knowledge that persons or children had been 
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previously injured jumping from the subject bridge. To the contrary, the facts reveal that Heidi's 
injury was not "reasonably foreseeable" by any of the Individual Respondents, nor could it have 
been by any reasonable person. There was nothing unusually dangerous about the bridge-
jumping activity. Dozens, if not, hundreds of jumps occurred without incident the evening and 
the morning prior to Heidi Beers' accident. The water was sufficiently deep; there were no rocks 
or obstructions in the water. Even adults on the scene felt the activity was safe and allowed their 
own children to jump. Heidi herself urged others to jump and she concedes that if she had not 
gotten hurt, she probably would not have considered this a dangerous activity. (R., 000836-
000837, Heidi Beers Depo., pp. 203-04.) Additionally, Heidi never indicated prior to her jump 
that she had any desire to participate in the jumping, she merely was a spectator. Heidi's last 
minute change of mind and quick jump from the bridge was unpredictable. Notably, as well, 
Heidi's mother indicated that if she had been at the bridge, she would have allowed Heidi to 
jump, obviously not foreseeing any harm to her own loved daughter. 
Not only was injury to Heidi unforeseeable, but also other factors considered in Rife 
clearly weigh against the creation of a new duty under the circumstances. Moral blame should 
not be placed on these Respondents simply because they were in somewhat close proximity to 
where the accident occurred. The Individual Respondents were bystanders who had no 
relationship to Heidi Beers, had no control over her and had not undertaken to act on her behalf. 
Imposing a duty in this instance would inappropriately create a specter of unlimited liability, of 
liability that no one would expect or foresee from merely having attended a casual social 
gathering. In summary, it should not be appropriate, under circumstances like these, to impose 
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liability on individuals who had nothing to do with Heidi Beers other than being present at the 
same campout. 
Each of the six Individual Respondents' conduct, called into question by the Beerses, is 
further evaluated below. At the end of the day, none of these Individual Respondents' conduct 
justify creating a new duty of care. 
Brad Day. The Beerses argue that Brad Day created an umeasonable, foreseeable risk of 
harm to Heidi and thus assumed the duty of supervising Heidi Beers' safety. The Beerses appear 
to ignore, however, that Mr. Day was not present at the bridge the following day when the 
accident happened, nor did he have any knowledge that Heidi Beers or the other youth planned 
to go to the bridge the next day. In fact, Mr. Day and his family left the campout before the 
accident occurred. (R., 000785, Brad Day Depo, p. 36.) The Beerses claim that Mr. Day had a 
duty to the children when they were jumping on Friday evening. Even if he owed a duty to the 
jumpers on Friday evening, Mr. Day did not owe a duty to Heidi at some other time. Even if Mr. 
Day had a duty to Heidi on Friday evening, that duty simply did not carry over to the following 
day's events at which Mr. Day was not present, and of which he did not have knowledge. In 
other words, it could not be foreseen that Heidi would jump from the bridge or that Heidi or 
anyone would get injured from the bridge jumping. Mr. Day's activities the evening before the 
accident did not justify the creation of a duty to Heidi the following day. 
In reality, the Beerses are not arguing that a new duty should be created, but that Mr. Day 
assumed a duty by his action. It is possible to create a duty where one previously did not exist 
"[i]f one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises 
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to perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Featherstone v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 
843, 875 P.2d 937, 940 (1994) (citing Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 
793 P.2d 703, 705 (1990)). Liability for an assumed duty, however, can only come into being to 
the extent that there is in fact an undertaking. See Bowling, 117 Idaho at 1032, 793 P.2d at 705. 
Although a person can assume a duty to act on a particular occasion, the duty is limited to the 
discrete episode in which the aid is rendered. See City of Santee v. County of San Diego, 211 
Cal.App.3d 1006, 259 Cal.Rptr. 757 (1989). In other words, past voluntary acts do not entitle 
the benefited party to expect assistance on future occasions, at least in the absence of an express 
promise that future assistance will be forthcoming. See id. at 762. See also, Fort Bend County 
Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Tex.1991) ("A person's duty to exercise 
reasonable care in performing a voluntarily assumed undertaking is limited to that undertaking, 
and will not normally give rise to an obligation to perform additional acts of assistance in the 
future.") Thus, even assuming arguendo that Mr. Day owed any duty of care the night before 
Heidi's injury, it could only be imputed for limited and specific purposes that evening. In 
addition, the duty allegedly assumed must have been a duty to supervise Heidi. It is undisputed 
that Mr. Day did not undertake that duty. 
Sharolyn Ririe. Unlike Brad Day, Ms. Ririe was physically present on the bridge when 
Heidi jumped, but her mere presence on the bridge did not create a duty of care toward Heidi. 
Ms. Ririe was there to be with her children, not to supervise Heidi. Ms. Ririe had no 
responsibility whatsoever toward Heidi Beers either during or after the campout. Heidi told Ms. 
Ririe she was fearful of jumping and Ms. Ririe simply stated that she also was afraid of heights, 
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not of reasonably foreseeable harm. (R., 000712, Sharolyn Ririe Depo, p. 43, 11. 9-13.) No duty 
attached by this simple exchange between Ms. Ririe and Heidi. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that Ms. Ririe knew Heidi was going to jump. In fact, her conversation with Heidi indicated that 
Heidi was not going to jump because she was afraid of heights. Ms. Ririe did ask some of the 
children if they checked for rocks or anything hazardous under the water. (R., 000710, Sharolyn 
Ririe Depo, p. 35.) Such a comment does not show that Ms. Ririe determined the bridge 
jumping to be dangerous, however. The simple comments by Sharolyn Ririe should not be 
enough to create a new duty under the circumstances. 
As fmiher discussed in this brief below, Ms. Ririe would only have a duty to Heidi if she 
had a special relationship to her and had the ability to control her actions. Turpen v. Granieri, 
133 Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999). Ms. Ririe had no such control over Heidi 
because she was not supervising her and was not in a position to control her actions, as would 
her parent. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Ms. Ririe knew or believed that the bridge 
jumping was dangerous or that anyone had sustained any prior injuries jumping from the subject 
bridge. Since Ms. Ririe was not affirmatively supervising Heidi and did not voluntarily assume 
any such duties toward her, the general rule applies that she had no affirmative duty to protect or 
warn her, especially since Heidi's injury was not foreseeable. See Coghlan, supra. 
Brent Rasmussen. See section 4 of this brief below. Mr. Rasmussen did not assume a 
duty to Heidi and his conduct clearly does not justify imputing a new duty of care to him. 
Garrett Haueter. See section 4 of this brief below. Mr. Haueter did not assume a duty to 
Heidi and his conduct clearly does not justify imputing a new duty of care to him. 
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Mark Kropf. Mark Kropf was not present on the bridge and he was nowhere in the 
vicinity of the bridge when Heidi was injured. Despite this, the Beerses assert that because Mr. 
Kropf had generalized concerns about children possibly jumping off the bridge 16, a new duty of 
care should be recognized under such a situation toward the children, including Heidi. There is 
no evidence, however, that Mr. Kropf knew of prior injuries sustained from jumping from the 
bridge and could not have anticipated that Heidi would jump or sustain an injury. In fact, he did 
not stop his own children from jumping, which was also allowed by his wife. As Mr. Kropf was 
not affirmatively supervising Heidi and did not assume such a duty, the general rule applies that 
did not owe a duty to protect or warn her. See Coghlan, supra. He merely had concerns in his 
own mind which he did not discuss with anyone else. The imposition of duty in such a situation 
would lead to absurd results requiring people to warn everyone about one's own subjective 
concerns. Every activity has some risk and, absent an undertaking or relationship or control, 
people do not have a duty to warn others about the risks. 
Brenda Kropf. Again, the Beerses appear to suggest that Ms. Kropf owed a duty of care 
to Heidi merely because she was present at the bridge when Heidi jumped and because Ms. 
Kropf told her own children to "be careful" when jumping into the river. While Ms. Kropf 
certainly has responsibilities to her own children, none of her actions or comments justify 
creating a new duty of care toward others, including Heidi. Furthermore, she assumed no duty of 
16 Plaintiffs failed to acknowledge Mr. Kropfs qualifying statements that he was "concerned" about jumping from 
the bridge only because he personally did not have the opportunity to evaluate the situation himself. (R., 000751, 
Mark KropfDepo., p. 38, 11. 17-21.) He also added that he trusted the judgment of his wife, who did believe it was 
totally safe to jump from the bridge. (Id) 
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care toward Heidi. Notably, Ms. Kropf allowed her own children to jump from the bridge. If 
anything, this demonstrates her belief that it was a safe activity. There is no evidence that Ms. 
Kropf knew of prior injuries sustained from jumping from the bridge and could not have 
anticipated that Heidi would jump or sustain an injury. As Ms. Kropf was not affirmatively 
supervising Heidi and did not assume such a duty, the general rule applies that she did not owe a 
duty to protect or warn her. See Coghlan, supra. 
In summary, none of the Individual Respondents owed any duty of care to Heidi Beers, 
as a matter of law, and, therefore, the District Court's dismissal of all negligence causes of action 
against her should be affirmed. 
3. There is No "Special Relationship" Between the Individual Respondents and 
Heidi. 
The Beerses paint m very broad strokes and inaccurately suggest that 8 of the 
Respondents constituted the "Ward Leadership" and had the "ability to supervise and control 
Heidi at the Ward Campout." (Appellants' Brief, p. 40.) There is no such evidence. 
As discussed above, there is "no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another absent 
unusual circumstances, which justify imposing such an affirmative responsibility." Coghlan v. 
Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). "An affirmative duty 
to aid or protect arises only when a special relationship exists between the parties." Coghlan, 
133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 311 citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (emphasis 
added). A special relationship can arise when the actor "has knowledge of an unreasonable risk 
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of harm and the right and ability to control the third party's conduct." Turpen v. Granieri, 133 
Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999)(emphasis added). 
As previously discussed, none of the individual Respondents undertook to supervise and 
control Heidi. None of them viewed jumping from the bridge as unreasonably dangerous. 
Further, nothing in the record suggests that any of the Individual Respondents had the right and 
ability to control Heidi's conduct. The Beerses have conceded the absence of any in loco 
parentis relationship. The Beerses cite no authority for a rule that any adult near a minor child 
assumes a duty and responsibility for that child's actions. None of the Respondents were Heidi's 
parents or were given any in loco parentis type authority, nor assumed any. Indeed, if any of the 
Respondents had told Heidi not to jump, she clearly could have ignored them. By failing to seek 
permission from any adult, Heidi did effectively demonstrate a lack of supervision and control. 
Since none of the Individual Respondents had the right and ability to control Heidi's conduct, 
there was no special relationship that existed from which a duty of care to Heidi could arise. 
The Beerses mischaracterize the record and claim that some of the Individual 
Respondents were "Ward Leadership" and thereby assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
supervise and protect Heidi from unreasonable risks of harm. The Beerses apparently make this 
assertion because the Individual Respondents had "callings,'' i.e., voluntary, part-time, unpaid, 
assignments, in the LDS Church. 17 The Beerses cite no authority to support the conclusion that 
these church callings subjected the individual defendants to personal liability. 
17 The Beerses ignore the fact that virtually all members of the LDS Church have callings. That does not mean they 
are "leaders." Further, having a calling in the Sunday School does not mean one has any responsibilities in other 
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As previously shown, none of the Individual Respondents had any role in leading, 
planning or carrying out the Ward campout. (See record, generally.) The Beerses attempt to 
argue that 8 of the Respondents' religious callings established a special relationship between 
them and Heidi and gave them the right and ability to control Heidi's actions. This is simply not 
accurate. 
Warren Ririe's religious calling was High Priest Group Leader. His only role at the 
campout was to cook breakfast. (R., 00698, p. 13. 11. 1-9.) Not only did Mr. Ririe not have any 
knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm to Heidi, but also his religious calling did not grant 
him the right and ability to control Heidi's conduct. As such, he had no special relationship to 
Heidi and was not liable for her injury. 
The remaining Respondents identified by the Beerses also had religious callings, but 
none of these callings conferred on them the right or ability to control Heidi at the campout. 
Sharloyn Ririe, Phil Haueter, Beth Rasmussen, Brenda Kropf and Bradley Day's callings were as 
various religious instructors or teachers during the general work week and/or on Sundays. They 
had no role during the cam pout in question as a result of their callings. Brent Rasmussen calling 
was as Ward Clerk, which entailed taking minutes and counting members present and certain 
meetings. His also had no role at the campout due to his religious calling. Mark Kropf s calling 
was as Counselor for Stake Young Men's Presidency, which required no role as to the campout. 
areas, such as Ward social activities. It is one of the great ironies in this case that the Beerses did not sue the 
individuals who actually did have responsibility for the campout, while at the same time suing numerous individuals 
who had no such responsibility. 
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Hence, none of these Individual Respondents owed any duty to Heidi and were not liable for her 
mJury. 
In conclusion, none of the Individual Respondents had a "special relationship" with Heidi 
that would impose a duty of care on them to Heidi. Indeed, the standard rule applies that the 
Respondents had no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect Heidi. As such, the District 
Court's dismissal of all negligence claims against these Respondents should be affirmed. 
4. Garrett Haueter and Brent Rasmussen Did Not Assume a Duty to Heidi 
Beers at the Bridge at the Time of Her Injury. 
The Beerses wrongly assert that Garrett Haueter and Brent Rasmussen assumed duties as 
to Heidi. As to Garrett Haueter, the Beerses focus on his deposition testimony that he told the 
other kids the specific area that had been checked in the river so that they would jump in those 
areas. (R., 000796, Garrett Haueter Depo, pp. 30-31.) This is a far cry from undertaking a duty 
to supervise Heidi. The Beerses have not shown that Mr. Haueter, a 19-year old young man, 
voluntarily undertook specific supervision of Heidi, as required by Featherstone, supra. Mr. 
Haueter had no Church responsibility over Heidi; in fact, he was not even a member of the 
Autumn Faire Ward. There is no evidence that Mr. Haueter specifically undertook a duty to 
supervise Heidi. Even if Mr. Haueter was supervising the bridge jumping activities, there is no 
evidence that he knew Heidi was participating in the activities (she had opted out and said she 
would not jump), and no evidence Mr. Haueter was in a position to control Heidi's actions. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that Mr. Haueter knew of any prior injuries sustained from 
jumping from the bridge and could not have anticipated that Heidi would jump or sustain an 
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injury, especially since Heidi said she was not going to jump and then unexpectedly changed her 
mind. As Mr. Haueter was not affirmatively supervising Heidi and did not assume such a duty, 
the general rule applies that he did not owe a duty to protect or warn her. See Coghlan, supra. 
Therefore, summary judgment on the Beers' negligence claims against Mr. Haueter should be 
affirmed. 
The Beerses also contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Brent 
Rasmussen assumed a duty to supervise Heidi when she was injured. In support of this 
statement, the Beerses argue that Brenda Kropf and Sharolyn Ririe, who were at the subject 
campout, believed Brent Rasmussen was supervising the bridge-jumping activity. (Appellants' 
Brief, p. 42.) Such statements by the Beerses are not accurate. In the context of discussing her 
own children, Brenda Kropf testified simply that it was her understanding that Mr. Rasmussen 
was already at the bridge; which she apparently assumed meant he was supervising the bridge 
jumping activity. (R., 001132-001133, Brenda Kropf Depo, pp. 29-31.) Contrary to the Beers' 
assertions, Sharolyn Ririe never testified that she believed Brent Rasmussen was supervising the 
bridge jumping activity. Ms. Ririe simply testified that her daughter, Camille, asked if she could 
go to the river with the Rasmussens and she said "yes'', but then felt she needed to go as well. 
(R., 000709, Sharolyn Ririe Depo, pp. 30-31) Sharolyn Ririe did not directly speak with the 
Rasmussens about going to the bridge. (Id., p. 32, 11. 3-5.) In summary, the actual deposition 
testimony of Brenda Kropf and Sharolyn Ririe, if properly scrutinized, provides absolutely no 
evidence that Mr. Rasmussen specifically assumed any supervision over Heidi at the bridge. 
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The general rule is that there is "no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another 
absent unusual circumstances, which would justify imposing such an affirmative responsibility," 
such as from a special relationship. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 
987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). In order to overcome this general rule and assume a duty, that 
specific person must voluntarily undertake to perform a specific act. See Featherstone, supra. 
The Beerses have identified no evidence that shows that Mr. Rasmussen specifically assumed a 
duty to supervise Heidi while she was on the bridge. Moreover, there is no evidence that Heidi 
or Mr. Rasmussen had a specific understanding that he was supervising her. 
The best the Beerses can do is to suggest that others may have assumed that Mr. 
Rasmussen was supervising the bridge-jumping activity. Since the person has to voluntarily 
undertake the specific act to assume a duty, see Featherstone, supra, it is clear that a third party 
cannot convey a duty of care on someone else by simply assuming they undertook the specific 
activity and duty. It obviously makes sense that the person assuming the duty needs to be aware 
that he is doing so. The Beerses, however, have identified no evidence that Mr. Rasmussen or 
Heidi understood Mr. Rasmussen to be supervising her on the bridge. 
Furthermore, assuming, without admitting, that Mr. Rasmussen assumed the duty to 
supervise the bridge-jumping (which, of course, is vehemently denied by Respondents), there is 
no evidence that Mr. Rasmussen knew Heidi wanted to participate in the activity he was 
allegedly supervising. Heidi said she was afraid to jump and stood off to the side when other 
children were jumping. (R., 000831, Heidi Beers Depo., p. 140, 142-43; R., 000712-713, 
Sharolyn Ririe Depo., pp. 42-43, 53.) Then, she quickly changed her mind and unexpectedly 
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jumped into the river in an area where none of the other children were jumping. (Id.) Since all 
signs point to Heidi opting out of the bridge jumping activity, Mr. Rasmussen could not have 
assumed a duty of care to supervise Heidi as there was no indication she was participating. In 
fact, Mr. Rasmussen was not aware Heidi intended to jump and was not on the bridge when 
Heidi jumped. (R., 000731-000733, Brent Rasmussen Depo., pp. 29-31, 34.) Therefore, since 
Heidi's jump was unexpected and Mr. Rasmussen was not on the bridge when she jumped, there 
was nothing Mr. Rasmussen could reasonably have done to protect Heidi from her jump or the 
alleged injury that she sustained. Most importantly, the general rule applies that he did not owe a 
duty to protect or warn Heidi. See Coghlan, supra. 
The Beerses also claim that there is evidence that Mr. Rasmussen was one of the first 
adults to aid Heidi when she was injured and that supposedly shows he assumed a duty to 
supervise Heidi prior to the injury while Heidi was on the bridge. Such evidence, though, only 
shows that Mr. Rasmussen tried to help Heidi after she was injured. This evidence is insufficient 
to show that Mr. Rasmussen voluntarily undertook a duty to supervise Heidi on the bridge. To 
reach such a conclusion is too far removed and too speculative to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
In summary, the District Court's granting of summary judgment on all negligence claims 
against Garrett Haueter or Brent Rasmussen should be affirmed since they did not assume any 
duties as to Heidi Beers. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the District Court's granting of summary judgment on all negligence 
claims by the Beerses against all Individual Respondents named in this appeal should be 
affirmed. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF CASE FOR THE CROSS-APPEAL 
Cross-Appellants Sharolyn Ririe, Garrett Haueter, Mark Kropf and Brent Rasmussen 
incorporate by reference herein the entire Statement of Case above. In its May 10th Order, the 
District Court denied summary judgment to Sharolyn Ririe, Garrett Haueter, Mark Kropf and 
Brent Rasmussen ("4 Individuals") on the child abuse tort cause of action under LC. § 6-1701, 
holding that the statute creates a duty to affirmatively act to protect children where a reasonable 
person would know Heidi Beers was likely to be harmed and finding that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether these 4 Individuals should have known that Heidi Beers was 
likely to get hurt jumping from the bridge and should have acted to stop her from jumping. (R., 
001545-001561.) The 4 Individuals appeal this decision for two main reasons: (1) the District 
Court incorrectly interpreted the child abuse tort statute as requiring an "affirmative duty to act", 
and (2) the District Court failed to construe the statue as requiring actual knowledge of danger to 
a child. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW OF CROSS-APPEAL 
"The standard of review of the lower court's determination on issues of statutory 
interpretation is one of free review." Big City Paramedics, LLC v. Sagle Fire Dist., 140 Idaho 
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435, 436, 95 P.3d 53, 54 (2004); see also Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 2008 WL 
4595239 (Idaho 2008) ("Our standard of review for statutory interpretation is well established: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises free review."). 
Statutory analysis begins with the literal words of the statute, giving the language its plain, usual 
and ordinary meaning. State v. Parker, 141 Idaho 775, 777, 118 P.3d 107, 109 (2005). 
However, statutes should not be construed so as to yield an absurd result. See, e.g., State v. Doe, 
140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 
666 (2004); State v. Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455, 456-57, 163 P.3d 244, 245-46 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Further, "[t]he Court should, whenever possible, construe a statute so as to achieve a 
constitutional result." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 68, 28 P.3d 1006, 1011 
(2001). "When the court finds that a statute is capable of two interpretations, one which would 
make it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the court should adopt that construction 
which upholds the validity of the act." State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 772, 25 P.3d 83, 85 
(2001). The existence of a duty is a question of law over which the Idaho Supreme Court 
exercises free review. Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 556, 808 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1991). 
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL 
1. The District Court Erred by Holding that LC. § 6-1701 and 18-1501 Create 
an Affirmative Duty to Act. 
Idaho Code§ 6-1701(1)(d), entitled "Tort actions in child abuse cases," provides that 
"[a]n action may be brought by or on behalf of any child against any person who has: Injured a 
child as defined in section 18-1501, Idaho Code." (Emphasis added.) This statute is unique 
because it provides for a civil cause of action, but references a criminal statute (LC. § 18-1501) 
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to define the elements of the civil injury to child action. 18 The District Court Judge clearly 
struggled with this crossover between civil and criminal law as he indicated, among other things, 
at the summary judgment hearing on April 11, 2011 that " ... the Idaho Legislature incorporated 
the term in the criminal statute, which heaven only knows why they decided to do it in that way 
... They have incorporated a definition totally unknown to the tort law." (Tr., p. 59, LL. 4-6 and 
24-25, p. 60, L. 1.) 
Idaho Code § 18-1501 sets forth several scenarios in which liability may be established. 
The Beers' Motion to Amend Complaint suggested that they were bringing the tort child abuse 
action pursuant to subsection 2, which provides: 
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to 
produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to 
suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or 
having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or 
health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be 
placed in such situation that its person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
Idaho Code§ 18-1501(2)(emphasis added). 
As there was nothing to suggest that the Cross-Appellants directly "inflicted" pain on 
Heidi and no evidence that they had "care or custody" 19 of Heidi, the District Court addressed 
the language wherein "[t]he criminal law defines injury to child as 'willfully caus[ing] or 
permit[ing] a child to suffer. LC. § 18-1501(2)."' (R., 001559.) The District Court focused on 
18 See I.C. § 6-1701(3), which provides: "The civil cause of action provided for in this section exist independently of 
any criminal action commenced pursuant to chapter 15, title 18, Idaho Code. A civil action may be pursued under 
the provisions of this chapter even if a criminal prosecution is not pursued." 
19 Indeed, the District Court specifically found, in other portions of its May I 0, 2011 Decision, that none of the 
remaining Individual Defendants undertook supervision of Heidi or had a special relationship with Heidi that 
brought her into their care or custody. (R., 001552-001159.) 
4843-0184-8079.1 38 
whether the Respondents acted "willfully." Idaho Code § 18-1501 (5) defines "willfully" for 
purposes of the child abuse statute as "acting or failing to act where a reasonable person would 
know the act or failure to act is likely to result in harm or to endanger the person, health, safety, 
or well-being of a child." 
Most cases that deal with the definition of willfulness are criminal cases. In further 
determining the meaning of "willfully,'' the District Court relied on a footnote in a civil case, 
Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 
(2007). In Steed, plaintiffs alleged that in 1997 they were sexually molested by Bradley Stowell 
while at a boy scout camp operated by Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of America 
(Grand Teton Council). Id. at 850. Plaintiffs brought the action against Boy Scouts of America, 
Grand Teton Council, Stowell, and others. Id. The Steeds sought to recover for assault and 
battery, false imprisonment, negligence per se, and negligence. Id. Steed only addressed the 
allegations against the nonprofit defendant, Grand Teton Council. Id. Among other things, 
plaintiffs brought suit under the tort child abuse statute, I. C. § 6-1701 ( 4 ). Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court looked at the definition of "willfully" in the context of deciding whether a 
negligence per se cause of action could be applied to this statute. Id. at 852-853. The Steed 
Court indicated that the definition of "willfully" meant that the defendant had to have "actual 
knowledge" that he was, in essence, injuring the child. Id. at 853-54. The actual knowledge 
definition applied because the case fell under the definition determined prior to the child abuse 
statute being amended in 2005. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court then noted, in dicta, in footnote 3 
the following: 
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In 2005, the legislature amended Idaho Code § 18-1501 to create a negligence 
standard of care for the conduct in that statute that must be done "willfully." It 
defined "willfully" in the statute to mean "acting or failing to act where a 
reasonable person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result in injury 
or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety or well-being of the 
child." Ch. 151, § 1, 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 467. Defining "willfully" to mean 
what "a reasonable person would know" is a negligence standard of care. Ahles v. 
Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 34 P.3d 1076 (2001)(a reasonable person standard 
encompasses the concept of ordinary negligence); Nelson v. Northern Leasing 
Co., 104 Idaho 185, 657 P.2d 482 (1983)(finding of negligence upheld based 
upon the risk to a child that a reasonable person would have foreseen); 57 A 
Am.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 133(2004)("The phrasing of the standard of care in 
negligence cases in terms of the 'reasonable person' is firmly implanted in the 
American law of negligence). 
In referencing the above footnote, the District Court in the case at bar incorrectly found "that 
Sections 6-1701 and 18-1501 create a duty to affirmatively act to protect children where a 
reasonable person would know that the child is likely to be harmed." (emphasis added) (R. 
001559). 
Even if one assumes that the dicta in Steed represents Idaho law (i.e., that Section 18-
1501 is a negligence standard), which is not admitted, the District Court improperly took this one 
step too far by ruling that Section 18-1501 creates an affirmative duty to act. As discussed in 
Respondents' section of this brief above, the law of negligence does not generally require 
affirmative action unless the defendant has assumed or voluntarily undertaken to act or some 
special relationship exists. Steed, supra, generally involved whether the duties in I.C. §§ 6-1701 
and 18-1501 applied to persons or organizations who were in positions of care or control over the 
plaintiffs. As discussed above, none of the Cross-Appellants in this case were in such a position 
of care or control and did not assume a duty to Heidi Beers. In other words, Cross-Appellants 
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were not in a position where they could "cause" or "permit" Heidi Beers to "suffer" as the 
statutory language requires. As such, the duties in LC. §§ 6-1701 and 18-1501 do not attach to 
the Cross-Appellants just as the District Court properly found that no duty applied to these 
individuals in the negligence portion of its decision. 
The preceding discussion reveals the stark inconsistency in the negligence section of the 
District Court's decision versus the child abuse section: in the negligence section the Court finds 
no duty to act and no breach of duty by the individual defendants; in the child abuse section, 
however, the District Court appears to accept just the opposite. It simply cannot be that a person 
could be exonerated from any negligence but yet be liable for "child abuse." This Court should 
not allow such a result because it is not only illogical but also bad public policy. Subjecting an 
individual to the label of "child abuser" should not result from application of a legal standard that 
is less rigorous than a negligence standard. 
2. The District Court Erred by Failing to Recognize that Actual Knowledge of a 
Danger is the Applicable Standard. 
As discussed above, the District Court, relying on a footnote in Steed, supra, found that 
"willful" in the context of LC. § 6-1701 and LC. § 18-1501 child abuse statutes means what most 
attorneys would understand to be negligence. (R., 001559.) A 2008 Idaho Court of Appeals 
case addressed the issue of the duty applicable under the child abuse statutes when it held as 
follows in a criminal case involving child abuse: 
The willfulness element of the endangerment clause from LC. § 18-1501 requires 
that the person providing care or custody of the child willfully endanger the child 
by subjected the child to a known risk of harm. State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 
165, 170, 75 P.3d 219, 224 (Ct. App. 2003). This does not require that the 
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defendant intended to harm the child, but it does require that the defendant placed 
the child in a potential harmful situation with knowledge of the danger. Id. 
State v. Morales, 146 Idaho 264, 192 P.3d 1088 (2008). The Morales case involves an incident 
that occurred after the 2005 amendment to the child abuse action and suggests that the defendant 
must actually know of the danger. The holding in Morales is a far cry from the affirmative duty 
to act standard enunciated by the District Court. The definition of willfully in Morales is a better 
compliment to tort law and should be followed here. 
It simply does not stand to reason that 12 of the individual defendants were not negligent 
in any way, as discussed above and as found as a matter of law by the District Court, but that 4 
of these defendants, i.e., Cross-Appellants Sharolyn Ririe, Garrett Haueter, Mark Kropf and 
Brent Rasmussen, were guilty of civil child abuse, simply because they were in a relatively close 
proximity to Heidi Beers when she jumped. Because a statute should not be construed to reach 
an absurd result, it makes better sense to adopt the standard listed in Morales, supra, that a 
person/defendant must actually know of the danger to a child in order to be liable under the child 
abuse tort statutes. As indicated in the original Respondents' brief, above, no one foresaw any 
injury from the activity, and no injury had occurred the night before or that day. 
Cross-Appellants respectfully request that the Supreme Court reverse the District Court 
and remand with instructions to apply the proper standard under I.C. § 6-1701, et seq. 
CONCLUSION FOR CROSS-APPEAL 
In conclusion, Cross-Appellants request that the District Court's decision denying 
summary judgment on the child abuse tort cause of action as to the 4 Individual Defendants be 
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REVERSED because it applied the wrong standard of law and that the case be remanded with 
instructions that the correct standard be applied. 
DATED this '??' of June, 2012. 
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